Introduction
As part of a "broken windows" approach to policing that focuses on lower level crimes in the hopes of preventing more serious crimes (Wilson & Kelling 1982) , several large US cities in recent decades have employed the proactive policing program known as " Stop, Question, and Frisk" (SQF) . While the case we focus on here, New York City, has been the most prominent example, SQF has also been heavily relied upon by police in Chicago, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles (Lerman & Weaver 2014a) . According to New York Police Department (NYPD) policy, "when a police officer reasonably suspects that a person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a felony or a Penal Law misdemeanor, the officer is authorized ... to stop, question and possibly frisk that individual."
1 The logic underlying SQF is that weapons recovered as a result of these stops are taken off the streets and thus prevented from being used in future crimes. The NYPD has aggressively employed SQF over the last two decades, making over 5 million stops since 2002 (peaking at 685,724 stops in 2011).
There has been a robust debate about the success of SQF in preventing and reducing crime, as well as formal and informal discussions of the effect NYPD's widespread use of SQF on citizen attitudes toward the police. However, there has been no study of the program's effect on political participation. We further hypothesize that depressed participation should be strongest among individuals who are members of groups that were disproportionately targeted; black and Hispanic as well as younger and male citizens. Finally, we hypothesize the effect of SQF to be different depending on the type of election. We expect the negative effect of SQF on turnout among individuals from groups disproportionately targeted to be weaker in mayoral elections since the mayor has direct control over stop-and-frisk policy. Higher turnout stemming from the desire to change the policy may counteract the depressing effect of SQF. Since voters are not considering candidates who have direct control over NYPD policy, we expect the negative effect of SQF to be stronger in midterm and and presidential elections.
In order to test the effect of SQF on political participation, we study voter turnout While the court decision and mayoral election resulted in the change in the NYPD's policy, we cannot rule out the existence of omitted factors that may have affected both where the NYPD chose to administer SQF and voter turnout in those areas. To account for this 7 Mummolo (2016) utilizes an NYPD internal memo on March 5, 2013 that instructed officers to provide a narrative description documenting the reasons that motivated each stop. Based on interviews of police officers, the author found that the new policy prompted officers to focus on stopping individuals for which there was strong suspicion of criminal activity. This resulted in an immediate steep drop in the overall number of stops. possibility we take two steps. First, we include individual fixed effects to control for timeinvariant factors that may influence a citizen's exposure to SQF and their decision to vote.
Second, we include several control variables in our analysis. These include individual-level factors such as age and partisan affiliation as well as community-level factors such as racial and ethnic composition, socioeconomic status, economic conditions, and crime.
Data and Specifications
To conduct our analysis, we combine individual voting histories obtained from the New York State Board of Election with the data on SQF from New York City Police Department.
8
Using the address information listed in the voter file and the SQF data, we geocode each individual voter and each incidence of stop-and-frisk.
9
Our primary measure of stop-and-frisk activity is surplus SQF. This quantity captures the number of police stops that did not lead to arrest, issue of summons, or reporting of recovered contraband items. Since these stops are less likely to be based on strong suspicion of a crime, they are more likely to be viewed by citizens as illegitimate.
10
To create a measure of SQF activity in an individual's immediate neighborhood, we used the geocoded data to draw a circle with radius 0.1 miles around each registered voter 8 We obtained voter history files from the New York State Board of Election at http://goo.gl/tXOJEn and the SQF data from New York City Police Department at http://goo.gl/hSnJoe.
9 Police officers fill out a "Stop, Question and Frisk Report Worksheet" (UF-250 form) for each stop. The UF-250 form includes the timing and geographical location of the stop as well as information about the reasons for the stop, the stopped individual, and what happened during the stop (such as whether contraband was found).
10 In an analysis of over four million stop-and-frisk records, Fagan (2010) found that a substantial proportion listed "furtive movement" as the sole reason for the stop.
in our sample (Dinesen & Sønderskov 2015 , Bisgaard, Sønderskov & Dinesen 2016 To examine overall effects of SQF on voter turnout, we use the following specification:
where i denotes a voter and t denotes an election year. The dependent variables Voted, is binary equalling 1 when registered voter i participated in election t and 0 otherwise. The main independent variable, Surplus SQF, is the total number of surplus stops in a registered voter's neighborhood, as defined by a geodisc of radius 0.1 miles, over the course of the year. respectively. In presidential elections, stops have no effect on turnout.
[ Tables 4 -6 about here]
The overall effect of SQF in these elections masks important heterogeneity. Given that SQF was not uniformly administered by the NYPD, we hypothesize that its demobilizing effect will vary based on citizens' race. In addition to racial disparities, SQF varies greatly by gender and age group; the police mainly targeted males as well as individuals under the age of 30. If frustration due to unequal application of SQF discourages registered voters from participating in elections, the negative effect may be stronger among male and younger individuals.
The heterogenous effect of SQF on turnout in mayoral elections is presented in Tables   7 and 8 . The first five columns of Table 7 display the effect of each stop on turnout for each racial group and the last two columns display the effect for males and females.
[ Table 7 and Table 8 are about here] SQF had demobilizing effect on white registered voters in mayoral elections but slightly increased turnout among black registered voters. There was no effect on turnout among Hispanic registered voters. Stops also reduced turnout among male and female registered voters. The negative effect of SQF on turnout in mayoral elections is not strongest among registered voters in their 20's and 30's but rather among those in their 60's or older.
To illustrate the effect of living in a low SQF neighborhood compared to a high SQF neighborhood, Figure 4 presents the marginal effect of a two standard deviation increase in SQF on turnout in mayoral elections among registered voters from different racial, gender, and age groups. A two standard deviation increase in SQF among men and women is associated with a reduction in turnout by 0.6 and 0.9 percentage points, respectively. The negative effect of a two standard deviation increase in SQF on voter turnout within the different age groups ranges from 0.4 to 1 percentage points.
The heterogenous effect of SQF on turnout in midterm elections is presented in Tables   9 and 10 . In the midterm elections, SQF reduced turnout among individuals from all racial groups; however, the effect of a surplus stop in a black registered voter's neighborhood is larger than in a Hispanic or white registered voter's neighborhood. SQF had a demobilizing 16 The standard deviations for SQF within each group are presented in Table 1 .
effect for both males and female registered voters, however the effect on males is slightly stronger than for females. Similar to our findings for mayoral elections, the negative effect of SQF is strongest among older rather than younger registered voters.
[ Table 9 and Table 10 Finally, the heterogenous effects for presidential elections are presented in Tables 11   and 12 . In presidential elections, a surplus stop is associated with increased turnout among white registered voters but slightly decreased turnout among black registered voters. SQF had no significant effect on turnout among Hispanic registered voters. The effect of a surplus 17 The standard deviations for SQF within each group are presented in Table 2 .
stop slightly decreased turnout among males but did not have a significant effect on females.
Among registered voters younger than 60 years old, SQF is associated with increased turnout;
for those 60 or older, surplus stops reduced turnout.
[ Table 11 and Table 12 
Discussion
Many of our findings are consistent with our expectations. We find that SQF had the overall effect of demobilizing the New York City electorate in mayoral and midterm elections.
However, exposure to SQF had a different impact depending on one's racial, gender, and/or age group. SQF had the biggest negative impact on black registered voters, the racial group most stopped by police. For black registered voters, SQF led to reduced turnout in midterm and presidential elections. SQF is associated with slightly higher turnout among black registered voters in mayoral elections. However, this may be due to the fact that the demobilizing effect of SQF is offset by a desire to change SQF policy. SQF also reduced turnout among Hispanic and male registered voters in midterm elections.
Some of our findings do not comport with our expectations. First, while SQF had a demobilizing effect on black and Hispanic registered voters in midterm and mayoral elections, surplus stops had no effect on Hispanic registered voters in presidential elections. In addition, contrary to our hypothesis, the negative effect of SQF on turnout in midterm elections was strongest among older rather than younger voters.
Our findings add to the growing literature examining the influence of contact with the criminal justice system on civic engagement. To this point, scholars have primarily focused on the demobilizing effect of incarceration. Here, we show that experiencing aggressive policing within one's community, specifically the stopping and questioning of innocent citizens, also serves to reduce civic engagement.
Since our analysis focuses on turnout among registered voters, it provides us with a somewhat incomplete picture of how SQF affects political participation. It is possible that stop-and-frisk discouraged individuals from registering to vote in the first place; therefore, our results represent a lower bound. This is especially likely to be the case among younger cohorts; younger citizens coming of age during the era of SQF may not register to vote.
There are two important limitations of our design. First, we hypothesize that stop- Note: A dependent variable is Voted, 0 = "No", 1 = "Yes". Each column indicates subset of voters. All columns include voter fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the census block level. Two-tailed p-values are reported. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Note: A dependent variable is Voted, 0 = "No", 1 = "Yes". Each column indicates subset of voters. All columns include voter fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the census block level. Two-tailed p-values are reported. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
